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It is widely accepted that cognition can be influenced by emotion, 
probably due to the biologically relevant information (e.g., food or 
predators) contained in emotional stimuli (Anderson & Phelps, 2001; 
LeDoux, 1996; Ohman, Flykt, & Ludqvist, 2000). It has been proposed 
that such stimuli have the capacity to recruit cognitive resources 
(Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1998; Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 
1993), in particular attentional resources, so that we are able to 
quickly detect them and efficiently respond when facing information 
that is directly linked to our survival (Bradley et al., 2003; Lang, 
Bradley, Fitzsimmons, et al., 1998; Morris, Ohman, & Dolan, 1998; 
Sabatinelli, Bradley, Fitzsimmons, & Lang, 2005). In the memory 
domain, it has been demonstrated that emotional materials are 
better remembered than non-emotional ones (Canli, Zhao, Brewer, 
Gabrieli, & Cahill, 2000). However, a number of studies in the last 
years have showed that the preferential access of emotional stimuli 
to our cognitive system can impair our cognitive performance when 
they are potentially distracting. Thus, unpleasant events have been 
reported as more distracting than neutral events when participants 
are maintaining non-emotional information in working memory 
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A B S T R A C T
Unpleasant irrelevant events are known to negatively affect our capacity to maintain neutral but task-
relevant information in working memory (WM). In parallel, anxiety biases our attentional responses to 
those stimuli that may be potentially threatening in order to adaptively enhance their detection and 
assessment. In this study, we investigated differences between healthy anxious and non-anxious volunteers 
while they performed a WM task in which neutral and unpleasant pictures were presented as distractors. 
Our results revealed that state anxiety could increase the interfering effect of neutral but not unpleasant 
distractors. These findings are discussed in regard to previous studies suggesting that anxiety and acute 
stress can decrease the level of specificity in the vigilance mechanism that serves to optimize the detection 
and evaluation of threats.
© 2014 Colegio Oficial de Psicólogos de Madrid. Production by Elsevier España, S.L. All rights reserved.
La ansiedad estado en personas sanas puede aumentar su vulnerabilidad a la 
distracción neutra pero no a la desagradable en la memoria de trabajo
R E S U M E N
Se sabe que los hechos desagradables irrelevantes influyen negativamente en nuestra capacidad para man-
tener en la memoria de trabajo información no emocional aunque importante para la tarea. Paralelamente, 
la ansiedad sesga nuestras respuestas atencionales a aquellos estímulos potencialmente amenazadores 
para, de este modo, mejorar adaptativamente su detección y valoración. En este trabajo hemos investigado 
las diferencias entre voluntarios sanos y ansiosos mientras realizaban una tarea de memoria de trabajo en 
la que se presentaban como distractores imágenes neutras y desagradables. Los resultados muestran que la 
ansiedad estado puede aumentar el efecto de interferencia de los distractores neutros pero no de los des-
agradables. Se comentan dichos resultados en relación a estudios anteriores que concluyen que la ansiedad 
y el estrés agudo pueden disminuir el nivel de especificidad en el mecanismo de vigilancia que sirve para 
optimizar la detección y evaluación de las amenazas.
© 2014 Colegio Oficial de Psicologos de Madrid. Producido por Elsevier España, S.L. Todos los derechos reservados.
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(Anticevic, Repovs, & Barch, 2010; Chuah et al., 2010; Denkova et al., 
2010; Dolcos, Diaz-Granados, Wang, & McCarthy, 2008; Dolcos & 
McCarthy, 2006). This phenomenon has been interpreted as the 
consequence of the competition between linked-to-survival 
distractors and task-relevant information for cognitive resources in 
the context of interference-based forgetting theories (Berman, 
Jonides, & Lewis, 2009). In that case, the deep processing of emotional 
stimuli would consume a significant part of the available attentional 
capacity, leaving insufficient resources for the actual ongoing task 
(Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988). 
Although the attention bias to emotional stimuli is considered 
adaptive in healthy people, a number of pathological and non-
pathological mood states can affect these dynamics, modifying the 
expected cognitive performance. In particular, anxiety and acute 
stress are known to induce a state of hypervigilance in which the 
detection and evaluation of potential threats is boosted (de Kloet, 
Joëls, & Holsboer, 2005; van Marle, Hermans, Qin, & Fernández, 
2009). This state of hypervigilance is considered adaptive as it 
increases our chances of successfully dealing with dangers in those 
situations in which our survival is compromised. However, this 
attentional bias in favor of potentially threatening stimuli is 
accompanied by impairments in selective attention (Henderson, 
Snyder, Gupta, & Banich, 2012; Tanji & Hoshi, 2008) and increased 
vulnerability to distraction (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005; Braunstein-
Bercovitz, Dimentman-Ashkenazi, & Lubow, 2001; Skosnik, 
Chatterton, Swisher, & Park, 2000). 
Previous studies have shown that stress can impair WM 
performance (Arnsten, 2009; Luethi, Meier, & Sandi, 2008; Lupien, 
Gillin, & Hauger, 1999; Oei, Everaerd, Elzinga, van Well, & Bermond, 
2006; Ramos & Arnsten, 2007; Schoofs, Preuss, & Wolf, 2008) and 
this has been related to the release of glucocorticoids (GCs) and their 
negative effect on WM (Elzinga & Roelofs, 2005; Lupien et al., 1999; 
Oei et al., 2006; Wolf et al., 2001).
In the present study we aimed to investigate whether state 
anxiety in healthy young volunteers can affect the cognitive control 
of emotional and neutral distraction when maintaining non-
emotional information in WM. If anxiety and acute stress are able to 
induce a state of hypervigilance, both neutral and unpleasant 
distractors should recruit more attentional resources in anxious 
participants than in non-anxious volunteers. Also, unpleasant 
distractors should be more interfering than neutral pictures in the 
anxious participants, since anxiety and acute stress produce an 
attentional bias towards the detection and evaluation of potential 
threats.
Method
Participants 
Thirty-four students from the Complutense University of Madrid 
and the Camilo José Cela University of Madrid (mean age 22.14 years 
and a range between 18 and 35 years) took part in the study. They 
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Eighteen participants 
were males (18-39 years old and a mean age of 22.16 years) and 
sixteen were females (18-33 years old and a mean age of 22.12 years). 
Before they performed the experimental task, they all completed the 
Spanish version of the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for 
Adults (Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 2002) and the Beck 
Depression Inventory (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 2006) (see Table 1 for 
demographic information). Participants received course credits for 
their time. 
Materials 
Items at encoding and recognition stages consisted of colored 
images of neutral faces. An oval mask was applied along the contours 
of the faces to remove ears and hair and avoid any potential non-face 
specific cues. A pair of faces was presented at the encoding stage 
while just one face was displayed at the recognition stage. Faces 
were counterbalanced across experimental conditions. For the 
interfering items presented at the maintenance period, 30 neutral 
and 30 unpleasant pictures were selected from the International 
Affective Picture System (IAPS) (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005) and 
matched in luminance, contrast, color, and figure-ground 
relationships (see Table 2 for mean normative values). 
Procedure 
A delayed-recognition WM paradigm with two experimental 
conditions, neutral and unpleasant distraction, was used. Each 
condition comprised 30 trials. Each trial began with a 1,000-ms 
intertrial interval (ITI), followed by the presentation of a pair of faces 
for 2000 ms (encoding phase). After a 1000-ms blank screen, an 
interfering stimulus was displayed for 2000 ms, followed by another 
1000-ms blank screen (maintenance phase). Next, just one face 
appeared on the screen for 1500 ms, followed by a 500-ms blank 
screen (recognition stage). Participants had to decide whether or not 
the face at the recognition stage has been one of the two previously 
encoded, by pressing one of two keys (Figure 1). 
Table 1
Volunteers’ demographic information
Age STAI-S STAI-T Anxiety 
score
BDI
All participants (n = 34)
    Mean 22.14 16.55 12.35 4.17 6.05
    SD 4.55 8.64 8.05 4.58 5.92
Low Anxiety (n = 17)
    Mean 21.94 12.64 11.76 0.88 5.40
    SD 5.86 5.64 5.91 0.60 4.28
High Anxiety (n = 17)
    Mean 22.35 20.41 12.54 7.47 5.40
    SD 2.87 9.50 9.91 4.45 4.28
No te. STAI-S = Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Adults - state score; 
STAI-S = Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Adults - trait score; Anxiety 
Score = STAI-S score minus STAI-T score. Higher scores represent more anxiety at the 
moment of facing the WM task, with regard to trait anxiety; BDI = Beck Depression 
Inventory.
Table 2
Mean normative values of pictures used in the experiment and mean subjective 
ratings of those pictures by our volunteers 
Condition IAPS 
valence
IAPS 
arousal
Subjective 
valence
Subjective 
arousal
All participants (n = 34)
    Neutral 4.91 (0.35) 2.77 (0.38) 5.01 (0.37) 2.32 (1.17)
    Unpleasant 2.39 (0.67) 6.23 (0.56) 2.50 (0.96) 6.54 (1.41)
Low anxiety (n = 17)
    Neutral 5.01 (0.34) 2.10 (1.03)
    Unpleasant 2.82 (0.91) 6.39 (1.43)
High anxiety (n = 17)
    Neutral 5.00 (0.41) 2.53 (1.29)
    Unpleasant 2.17 (0.91) 6.70 (1.43)
Note. Standard deviations are shown in parenthesis.
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Before the experiment, all the volunteers underwent four training 
trials in order to ensure that they completely understood the task. To 
avoid inducing long-lasting mood states, the order of trials were 
constrained so that no more than three trials of the same condition 
were consecutively presented. Once the WM paradigm was 
completed, all the pictures used as interference were presented to 
the participants and they were asked to rate them regarding 
emotional valence and arousal, using the Self-Assessment Manikin 
(SAM) self-report scale (Lang, 1980). Participants were allowed to 
see each picture as long as they wanted, and the order of presentation 
of the pictures was also constrained in the same way, but in a 
different sequence, than for the WM task.
Median Split Design
Once the thirty-four participants completed the experimental 
procedure, we used their individual scores at the STAI scale to extract 
a measurement of how anxious their felt when facing the WM task. 
To do this, we subtracted the state score from the trait score for every 
single participant. Thus, low scores represent low anxiety with 
regard to basal anxiety levels, while high scores represent high 
anxiety, when facing the cognitive task, in comparison to state 
anxiety levels. Then, we split the whole group of participants in two 
subgroups, based on the median of the 34 volunteers in this anxiety 
score. Participants whose anxiety scores were below the median 
were included in the low anxiety group (mean anxiety score 0.88 in 
a range between 0 and 2) while volunteers with anxiety scores over 
the median were included in the high anxiety group (mean anxiety 
score 7.47 in a range between 3 and 18) (see Table 1 for means and 
standard deviations in each group). 
Results
Di fferences between Groups in Anxiety and Depression
Groups did not differ in age (U = 101.50, Z-score = -1.49, p > .1, r = 
-.25), STAI-S (U = 137.50, Z-score = 0.24, p = .08, r = -.04), and BDI 
scores (U = 130.50, Z-score = -0.48, p > .1, r = -.08). Volunteers in the 
high anxiety group showed higher STAI-T scores than participants in 
the low anxiety group (U = 57.50, Z-score = -3.01, p < .005, r = -.51). 
As expected, anxiety scores in the high anxiety group were higher 
than in the low anxiety group (U = 0.00, Z-score = -5.07, p < .005, r = 
-.87)
Accuracy 
Figure 2 shows the mean accuracy (hits and correct rejections) for 
each condition and group. A repeated-measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) revealed a significant main effect of condition, F(1, 32) = 
12.02, p < .005, eta squared = .27, and a significant effect of condition 
x group interaction F(1, 32) = 5.97, p < .05, eta squared = .15. Analysis 
did not reveal a significant main effect of group, F(1, 32) = 0.79, p > .1, 
eta squared = .02. Post-hoc comparisons using the Bonferroni 
correction revealed a lower performance during unpleasant 
distraction compared to neutral distraction (p < .005). They also 
showed that this difference in performance between condition was 
present in the low anxiety group (p < .05) but not in the high anxiety 
group (p > .05).
Subjective Emotional Ratings 
As expected, subjective valence ratings differed as a function of 
affective category in the whole group of participants, with 
unpleasant pictures rated as more unpleasant than neutral ones 
(Z-score = 5.06, p < .001, r = .61). Arousal ratings also varied as a 
function of affective category unpleasant pictures rated as more 
arousing than neutral pictures (Z-score = 5.08, p < .001, r = -.61). 
Differences in valence appeared in the same direction in the low 
anxiety group (Z-score = 3.62, p < .001, r = .62) and in the high 
 ENCODING MAINTENANCE RECOGNITION
 1000 ms 2000 ms 1000 ms 2000 ms 1000 ms 1500 ms 500 ms
 NEUTRAL UNPLEASANT
Figure 1. Diagram of the delayed-recognition WM paradigm 
Note. Neutral and unpleasant distractors were pseudorandomly presented during the maintenance stage. Volunteers were trained to learn and maintain the pair of faces into WM, 
look at the distracter, and then decide whether the face at the recognition stage is one of the two previously encoded or not, by pressing one of two keys.
90
85
80
75
70
65
NEUTRAL DISTRACTION UNPLEASANT DISTRACTION
 Low anxiety
 High anxiety
Figure 2. Mean accuracy (expressed as percent correct) in the WM task
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anxiety group (Z-score = 3.57, p < .001, r = .61). Differences in arousal 
also appeared in the same direction in the low anxiety group 
(Z-score = 3.62, p < .001, r= .62) and in the high anxiety group 
(Z-score = 3.62, p < .001, r = .622). Although there were no differences 
between the low anxiety and the high anxiety group in valence (U 
=131.50, Z-score = -0.44, p > .1, r = -.07) and arousal (U = 116.50, 
Z-score = -0.96, p > .1, r = -.16) for neutral pictures, participants in 
the high anxiety group rate unpleasant distractors as more 
unpleasant than volunteers in the low anxiety group did (U = 74.50, 
Z-score = -2.41, p < .05, r = -.41). There were no differences between 
groups in their arousal ratings for unpleasant distractors (U = 
130.50, Z-score = -.48, p > .1, r = -.08).
Discussion
The present study aimed to investigate the effect of acute anxiety 
on the cognitive control of emotional and neutral distraction while 
maintaining non-emotional information in WM in healthy young 
volunteers. Using a median split procedure we compared participants 
that showed low levels of state anxiety at the beginning of the WM 
task to those who experienced a higher level of anxiety in such 
situation. Overall, unpleasant distractors produced higher levels of 
distraction during the WM task, leading to a worsening of 
performance at the recognition stage of the task. This result is 
consistent with previous literature in the field, and provides further 
evidence regarding the detrimental influence of negatively-valence 
distractors in the on-line maintenance of non-emotional information 
in WM (Anticevic et al., 2010; Chuah et al., 2010; Denkova et al., 
2010; Dolcos et al., 2008; Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006). This effect has 
been interpreted in regard to the concept of motivated attention 
(Bradley et al., 2003), as the consequence of the preferential 
attentional capture of information linked to survival, so that 
emotional but irrelevant events become powerful interferences that 
compete with task-relevant information for cognitive resources. 
Contrary to our initial hypothesis, results from our analysis did not 
show significant overall differences between groups. However, they 
did reveal a significant effect of the interaction between group and 
condition, in a way that high anxiety participant’s performance after 
neutral distraction was worse than it was in the low anxiety group. 
In parallel, both groups did not differ in successful performance after 
unpleasant distraction. In other words, while low anxiety participants 
were more distracted by unpleasant events than by neutral stimuli, 
as previously reported in the literature (Anticevic et al., 2010; Chuah 
et al., 2010; Denkova et al., 2010; Dolcos et al., 2008; Dolcos & 
McCarthy, 2006), high anxiety volunteers experienced the same 
level of distraction after neutral than after unpleasant information. 
Therefore, participants with high levels of anxiety when facing the 
WM task experienced a reduction in their capacity to control neutral 
interference, when compared to non-anxiety participants. 
It has been previously reported that acute stress and anxiety can 
impair WM performance (Arnsten, 2009; Luethi et al., 2008; Lupien 
et al., 1999; Oei et al., 2006; Ramos & Arnsten, 2007; Schoofs et al., 
2008), probably through the associate GCs release (Elzinga & Roelofs, 
2005; Lupien et al., 1999; Oei et al., 2006; Wolf et al., 2001). Indeed, 
psychological stress can reduced WM-related activity over the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) (Qin, Hermans, van Marle, Luo, 
& Fernández, 2009), a part of the prefrontal cortex that has been 
consistently related to WM function (D’Esposito, Postle, & Rypma, 
2000; Nee et al., 2013; Smith & Jonides, 1999).
Although acute stress and anxiety are known to reallocate 
attentional processes in favor of threatening stimuli (de Kloet et al., 
2005; van Marle et al., 2009), our main finding revealed that in 
healthy volunteers high levels of anxiety can make neutral events as 
distracting as unpleasant events, even when the former do not 
represent any potential threat. However, it has been also reported 
that stress also decreases the level of specificity in the vigilance 
mechanism that serves to optimize the detection and evaluation of 
threats (van Marle et al., 2009). Following this rationale, it is 
conceivable that participants with high anxiety scores responded to 
both neutral and unpleasant distractors in a similar manner, as if 
both were equally threatening. Interestingly, subjective ratings of 
emotional valence and arousal for neutral distractors did not differ 
between the low anxiety and the high anxiety groups. Since these 
subjective assessments took place after completing the WM task, we 
suggest that such decreased specificity might only affect the most 
automatic attentional capture and not the entire appraisal processing, 
at least in no-pathological individuals. 
However, one might have expected to observe enhanced 
emotional distraction effects in participants with highest levels of 
anxiety. By contrast, our groups did not differ in their ability to resist 
unpleasant distractors in WM. However, some studies have reported 
similar results, and they have also demonstrated that stress-related 
GCs release can even be beneficial in coping with unpleasant 
distraction (Oei et al., 2011; Oei, Tollenaar, Spinhoven, & Elzinga, 
2009; Putman, Hermans, Koppeschaar, van Schijndel, & van Honk, 
2007).
Finally, it is important to highlight that these differences between 
anxiety groups in the cognitive control of both neutral and unpleasant 
distraction in WM were mainly related to state anxiety rather than 
to trait anxiety and depressive moods, since both groups did not 
differ in STAI-T and BDI scores, but were different in STAI-S score. 
Trait anxiety has been associated with enhanced attentional capture 
by threatening images (Mathews & MacLeod, 1994) and with 
increased capture by irrelevant information without clear emotional 
value (Moser, Becker, & Moran, 2012). Besides, the hypervigilance 
theory (Eysenck, 1992) proposes that people with high levels of trait 
anxiety also showed an attentional bias toward potentially 
threatening events. If we have used the pure state anxiety score from 
the STAI, one might be concerned about the possibility that 
individuals with highest scores in this scale also showed high levels 
of anxiety in the trait scale of the STAI. In that case, there would have 
been a confound between the specific contribution of state and trait 
anxiety levels to the WM effects. Nevertheless, our procedure 
contributed to control the effect of trait anxiety and suggest that 
differences between groups in the WM task were mainly related to 
state anxiety.
In summary, our results provide further evidence in favor of the 
detrimental effect of unpleasant distractors on the maintenance of 
non-emotional information in WM (Anticevic et al., 2010; Chuah et 
al., 2010; Denkova et al., 2010; Dolcos et al., 2008; Dolcos & 
McCarthy, 2006). Also, they suggest that healthy anxious individuals 
might experience an increased vulnerability to non-threatening 
irrelevant stimuli in such a way that performance during the actual 
relevant task might be compromised, while potentially threatening 
distractors did not affect them more than they do in non-anxious 
individuals.
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